A model-theoretic interpretation of environmentally-induced
  superselection by Fields, Chris
ar
X
iv
:1
20
2.
10
19
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
3 M
ay
 20
12
A model-theoretic interpretation
of
environmentally-induced superselection
Chris Fields
815 East Palace # 14
Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
fieldsres@gmail.com
November 28, 2018
Abstract
The question of what constitutes a “system” is foundational to quantum mea-
surement theory. Environmentally-induced superselection or “einselection” has been
proposed as an observer-independent mechanism by which apparently classical sys-
tems “emerge” from physical interactions between degrees of freedom described com-
pletely quantum-mechanically. It is shown here that einselection can only generate
classical systems if the “environment” is assumed a priori to be classical; einselection
therefore does not provide an observer-independent mechanism by which classicality
can emerge from quantum dynamics. Einselection is then reformulated in terms of
positive operator-valued measures (POVMs) acting on a global quantum state. It is
shown that this re-formulation enables a natural interpretation of apparently-classical
systems as virtual machines that requires no assumptions beyond those of classical
computer science.
Keywords: Decoherence, Einselection, POVMs, Emergence, Observer, Quantum-to-classical
transition
1 Introduction
The concept of environmentally-induced superselection or “einselection” was introduced
into quantum mechanics by W. Zurek [1, 2] as a solution to the “preferred-basis problem,”
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the problem of selecting one from among the arbitrarily many possible sets of basis vectors
spanning the Hilbert space of a system of interest. Zurek’s solution was brilliantly simple:
it transferred the preferred basis problem from the observer to the environment in which the
system of interest is embedded, and then solved the problem relative to the environment.
Any physical system S interacts with the environment E in which it is embedded; this
interaction can be represented by a Hamiltonian HS−E. If the internal states of both S
and E are stable over the instantaneous timeframes relevant to individual observations,
then the instantaneous time evolution of the joint system-environment state |S ⊗ E〉 is
detemined only by HS−E, i.e. the Schro¨dinger equation (∂/∂t)|S ⊗E〉 = −ı~HS−E|S ⊗E〉
holds. If this is the case, both |S〉 and |E〉 must be eigenstates of HS−E, so there are
eigenbases {|si〉} and {|ei〉} for S and E respectively with basis vectors |sk〉 ∈ {|si〉} and
|ej〉 ∈ {|ei〉} such that 〈ej|HS−E|sk〉 = λjk where λjk is a real number representing the
instantaneous coupling between S and E. The basis {|si〉} for S that is selected by HS−E
is completely observer-independent; to employ a canonical example, a momentarily-stable
ambient visible-spectrum photon field einselects the position basis for all momentarily-stable
systems significantly larger than a few microns, completely independently of whether anyone
interacts with the photon field by eye.
Einselection revolutionized decoherence theory by converting the environment from a pas-
sive sink for quantum coherence into an active “witness” that continuously determines
the observable states of the systems embedded in it [3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 8]. Quantum states
that are continually “witnessed” by the environment are effectively classical; hence it has
been proposed, under the rubric of “quantum Darwinism,” that einselection provides an
observer-independent physical mechanism for the emergence of classicality [9, 10]. If this
proposal is correct, einselection answers one of the deepest questions in quantum measure-
ment theory: the question of “how one can define systems given an overall Hilbert space
‘of everything’ and the total Hamiltonian” ([3] p. 1794). Hence it also answers Einstein’s
famous question of whether “the Moon exists only when I look at it” ([11]; quoted in [12]
p. 38); nobody has to look, because the environment is always looking (cf. [13, 14]). In
recognition of this, einselection has been called “the most important and powerful idea in
quantum theory since entanglement” ([15] p. 94).
The present paper shows that a recognizably classical world of discrete, bounded objects
acted upon by external forces only emerges via einselection if “systems” are defined in
an observer-dependent way. It thus shows that einselection does not provide an observer-
independent mechanism for the emergence of classicality. It then describes an alternative
view of einselection in which positive operator-valued measures (POVMs; e.g. [16], Ch.
2), not system-environment interaction Hamiltonians, provide the information with which
unique bases for discrete, observer-recognizable systems are selected. This alternative view
is explicitly observer-dependent, and relies on the idea that the environment E implements
an information channel that observers employ to investigate the properties of systems of
interest. In this alternative view, einselection is not as a physical process, but a semantic
process that selects a particular classical virtual machine from among the arbitrarily many
that are consistent with the quantum information dynamically encoded by the environment.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section, “Observer-independent versus observer-
dependent notions of the ‘emergence’ of classicality” distinguishes the observer-independent
notion of emergence supported by the environment as witness formulation of decoherence
[3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 8] from the observer-dependent notion of emergence advocated by Wallace [17]
among others. The third section, “Observer-independent einselection does not produce clas-
sicality” shows that einselection does not provide a mechanism for the observer-independent
emergence of classicality by showing that the “environment as witness” formalism implicitly
assumes the effective classicality of the environment. The fourth section, “Reformulating
einselection using POVMs” develops the necessary formalism for viewing einselection as
a consequence of interactions between observers and physically-implemented information
channels. The fifth section, “Systems as virtual machines” shows that einselection as re-
formulated in terms of POVMs can be viewed as an entirely semantic process. From this
perspective, einselection is formally analogous to the process of interpreting the observed
behavior of any physical device as classical computation, i.e. as the realization of a classical
virtual machine. The paper concludes by suggesting that this semantic view of einselection
may provide a precise and self-consistent way of describing the initialization of quantum
computing algorithms with classical data.
2 Observer-independent versus observer-dependent
notions of the “emergence” of classicality
Before proceeding, it is necessary to say with some precision what is meant by “classicality”
and to distinguish “observer-independent” from “observer-dependent” notions of its “emer-
gence.” Let us explicitly assume that minimal quantum mechanics - quantum mechanics
with no “collapse postulate” - is true universally, and hence that the Schro¨dinger equation
(∂/∂t)|U〉 = −ı~HU |U〉 describes the evolution of the universe U as a whole; all available
experimental evidence is consistent with this asumption (e.g. [18]). From an interpretative
perspective, this assumption corresponds to “Stance 1” as defined by Landsman, the view
that “quantum theory is fundamental and universally valid, and the classical world has
only ’relative’ or ’perspectival’ existence” ([15], p. 6). It is with respect to this assumption
of the correctness of minimal quantum mechanics that einselection is defined; the goal of
einselection is to render the “perspectival” existence of quantum systems, and in partic-
ular the macroscopic quantum systems that appear classical to observers, relative to the
“perspective” of the universe as a whole [3, 4, 5, 6].
Let us also assume that the universe comprises an arbitrarily large and hence effectively
infinite collection of “elementary” entities characterized by quantum degrees of freedom.
The behavior of a system S that comprises some finite subset of these elementary entities is
then effectively classical if it can be described to an approximation sufficient for all practical
purposes (FAPP) by the formalism of classical physics, which will for simplicity be taken
to mean non-relativistic classical physics. Classical physics requires spatially separated
systems to have separable states - i.e. that there be no entanglement - and requires all
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measurements to commute and be non-contextual. Schlosshauer, for example, characterizes
classicality by the absence of “quantum” restrictions on measurement:
“Here (i.e. in classical physics) we can enlarge our ‘catalog’ of physical properties
of the system (and therefore specify its state more completely) by performing an
arbitrary number of measurements of identical physical quantities, in any given
order. Moreover, many independent observers may carry out such measurements
(and agree on the results) without running into any risk of disturbing the state
of the system, even though they may have been initially completely ignorant of
this state.”
([8] p. 16)
The ability of “initially completely ignorant” observers to discover the states of a classical
system is similarly emphasized by Ollivier, Poulan and Zurek in their operational definition
of objectivity:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
(p. 1 of [5]; p. 3 of [6])
Observers can approach a system from a position of complete ignorance only if they can take
its existence as a well-defined entity for granted: picking the system out from the other
furniture of the universe must be entirely unproblematical. Being a well-defined entity
requires having a well-defined boundary that enforces causal independence from other such
entities. Following Einstein, Fuchs expresses this requirement rhetorically: “what is it that
A and B are spatially distant things than that they are causally independent?” ([19] p.
15). From an ontological perspective, a classical Moon must simply be there, as a bounded
entity distinct from everything else, whether anyone bothers to look at it or not.
Classicality in this sense can “emerge” from the unitary dynamics of the elementary en-
tities of a quantum universe by an observer-independent physical mechanism only if this
mechanism enforces the effective boundedness and effective separability of distinct and
spatially-separated collections of elementary entities. Ollivier, Poulan and Zurek’s claim
that the “witnessing” of the states of quantum systems by the environment renders them
“objective” for initially-ignorant observers [5, 6] is the claim that einselection is such a
mechanism. For this emergence claim to be true, einselection must not only establish a
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preferred basis for S, but also establish a boundary for S that separates and hence distin-
guishes it from all spatially-distinct systems. This boundary need not be ontological in the
strict sense of being an entity in addition to the elementary entities composing the uni-
verse, but must be “FAPP ontological” in the sense that an “initially completely ignorant”
observer can take it for granted.
This FAPP ontological requirement for the observer-independent emergence of classicality
can be understood by contrast with the much less stringent requirements for observer-
dependent emergence, the emergence of an object, property or phenomenon by means of a
mechanism that depends on particular properties of a specified observer or class of observers.
A particularly clear example of observer-dependent emergence is provided by Wallace, who
defines an emergent “pattern” as follows:
“A macro-object is a pattern, and the existence of a pattern as a real thing
depends on the usefulness - in particular, the explanatory power and predictive
reliability - of theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.”
(p. 93 of [17]; p. 58 of [20])
This definition relies on the “usefulness” of theories, and hence on the existence of observers
who find them useful. While Wallace describes decoherence and einselection using the stan-
dard observer-independent formalism, he notes that the identification of einselected systems
as quasi-classical requires “making a fairly unprincipled choice of system-environment split
and then noticing that that split led to interesting behaviour” ([20] p. 64). Here the
mechanism of einselection is not required to establish the boundary separating the system
from its environment; this boundary is stipulated by an observer, who then “notices” that
the behavior of the stipulated system is “interesting.” Thus while Wallace never employs
the term “observer-dependent” and never discusses the properties that an observer might
need to possess in order to find behavior interesting or engage in the construction of use-
ful theories, his account of emergence depends on the existence of observers having these
properties.
If the system-environment boundary at which HS−E is defined can only be specified in an
observer-dependent way, then the emergence of classicality by einselection cannot be re-
garded as observer-independent: the Moon is only there if someone stipulates its boundary,
and any such stipulation requires looking. “Emergence” in this observer-dependent sense
is not ontological even FAPP; to say that something is “emergent” in this sense is rather
to make an epistemic claim that its behavior is unpredictable FAPP from fundamental
physics. For Wallace, such epistemic claims of emergence apply equally to phonons, tigers,
and chess-playing programs. On Wallace’s observer-dependent account of emergence, if no
observer found the Moon to be interesting, there would still be a dense concentration of
elementary particles in the sky, but there would be no emergent quasi-classical object.
Wallace’s implicit characterization of observers as theory-constructors with an ability to
recognize some phenomena as interesting can be contrasted with the more typical charac-
terization of an observer as “any physical system having a definite state of motion” ([21]
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p. 1641) or “a quantum system interacting with the observed system” ([8] p. 361). These
traditional “Galilean” characterizations do not attribute any particular structure to ob-
servers, and are hence consistent with observers being “initially completely ignorant” when
they encounter a system to be observed. In particular, a Galilean observer does not possess
“pragmatic information” [22] about what properties may or may not be interesting, and
does not actively identify particular systems as targets of interaction. Hence the distinc-
tion between observer-dependent and observer-independent accounts of emergence can be
formulated as a distinction between non-Galilean and Galilean concepts of the observer.
Non-Galilean observers stipulate what systems exist and hence do not require FAPP onto-
logical emergence; Galilean observers do not make such stipulations, have no choice but to
take the existence of systems for granted, and hence do require FAPP ontological emergence.
It has been argued elsewhere that Galilean observers are not capable of identifying systems
even if their existence is taken for granted [23]. The next section shows that einselection
and environmental “witnessing” do not justify taking “emergent” systems for granted.
3 Observer-independent einselection does not produce
classicality
In orthodox, realist quantum mechanics, a “system” is represented by a Hilbert space, each
vector of which corresponds to an admissible physical state (e.g. [24]); the universe U can,
therefore, be considered to be characterized by a Hilbert space HU . Any finite system S
can then be thought of as a proper subspace HS ⊂ HU . In an observer-free universe, the
environment E of any system S can be taken to be U \ S; this expression can be employed
as an approximation in a universe containing only Galilean observers, since such observers
are quantum systems that can be assumed to be negligibly small compared to U , and by
assumption they do not stipulate systems, including E. In this case, the S − E boundary
is the boundary of the subspace HS within HU . A Hamiltonian HS−E can be defined at
this boundary; HS−E = 0 if but only if the degrees of freedom within S do not interact
in any way with the degrees of freedom outside S, a situation that can be dismissed as
physically uninteresting. Provided that over a time interval ∆t the self-Hamiltonians HS
and HE are small compared to HS−E, eigenbases {|si〉} and {|ei〉} for S and E respectively
are einselected by HS−E within the interval ∆t. As the state of the environment is only
observationally relevant close to both S and some observer O, the requirement that HE
is small can be relaxed to the requirement that HF is small for some proximate fragment
F ⊂ E; in this case a basis {|fi〉} of F is einselected.
If no physical principle restricts the choice of S, this construction can be carried out sep-
arately for every subspace HS of HU and proxmiate fragment F ⊂ U \ S for which a ∆t
can be found during which HS and HF are small. Thus if no physical principle restricts
the choice of S, the state of every subset of U that is surrounded by a reasonably stable
local environment can be considered to be einselected by U : U thus “witnesses” the states
of not one but all of its subsystems. This formal possibility immediately raises three ques-
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tions. First, are there subspaces of HU for which the requirement of small HS and HF
are satisfied over all but a negligible subset of time intervals? Second, are there significant
time intervals during which the requirements that HS and HF be small are simultaneously
satisfied for multiple distinct subspaces of HU ? Finally, are there significant time intervals
for which the requirements that HS and HF be small are simultaneously satisfied both for
multiple distinct subspaces of HU and for multiple environmental fragments that only in-
tersect far from any observers? The first condition must be satisfied, clearly, by any system
S that emerges as a classical object for a significant period of time. The second condition
must be satisfied by any significant time interval during which multiple classical objects
emerge. The third condition must be satisfied, within the quantum Darwinist formalism
[9, 10], by any significant time interval during which multiple classical objects emerge for
multiple observers, as this formalism requires that the observers occupy mutually-separable
environmental fragments.
Let us examine these questions in detail, beginning with the first. Suppose HS ⊂ HU and
that HS and HF are small compared to HS−E and hence to HS−F . Since both S and F are
by assumption composed of elementary entities, the Hamiltonian HS−F =
∑
i,j Hij where
Hij is the interaction between the i
th elementary entity Si within S and the j
th elementary
entity Fj within F . If the average interaction of these elementary entities is < Hij > and
S is taken to comprise N elementary entities, then N < Hij > >> HS or HF . Consider
now an alternative system S ′ = S ⊗ Fk, where Fk is one of the elementary entities of F .
If Hik ≥ < Hij > for j 6= k, then HS′ ≥ HS. If Hik ≤ < Hij > for j 6= k, then
HF ′ ≥ HF , where F
′ = F \Fk. In either case, S
′ is less “stable” that S; hence some number
of such systems S ′ can be constructed that satisfy the conditions for einselection, but as
elementary entities are added to S, eventually an S ′ will be constructed for which either HS′
or HF ′ is too large for einselection. Similar sets of alternative systems can be constructed
by subtracting elementary entities from S, or by adding some and subtracting other ele-
mentary entities from S. In either case, some of the constructed alternatives satisfy the
conditions for einselection, but too many alterations of S will generate alternative systems
that violate the conditions for einselection. Satisfaction of the conditions for einselection by
S is, therefore, consistent with the existence of a “halo” of both larger and smaller systems
within the environmental fragment F that also satisfy the conditions for einselection, but
is inconsistent with arbitrarily many alternative systems within F satisfying these condi-
tions. Nothing in this reasoning, of course, limits the einselection of alternative systems for
different choices of F .
As Wallace [17] points out in his discussion of decoherent histories, many of the alternative
systems that satisfy the conditions for einselection nearly as well as S, and that may be
indistinguishable from S by observations carried out at any finite resolution ǫ, may be
spatially dissociated or otherwise distinctly non-classical. As the time interval ∆t over
which S and its alternatives satisfy the conditions for einselection increases, moreover,
the dominance of HS−E over HS guarantees that S itself will increasingly dissolve into F .
Hence if no physical principle restricts the choice of S, any system that appears classical by
einselection will be accompanied by a halo of indistinguishable and in some cases overtly
7
non-classical systems at all times, and S will itself become increasingly non-classical over
time. While the existence of such a halo has no effect on the einselection of states of S, it
does create an insurmountable problem for observers attempting to uniquely identify S, as
has been pointed out previously [25, 26].
The alternative systems composing the halo of a system S that are constructed as above all
overlap with S. It is clear, however, that non-overlapping systems embedded in the same
environmental fragment F cannot simultaneously satisfy the conditions for einselection.
Suppose S1 and S2 are embedded in F = F 1 ∪ F 2 where F 1 ⊃ S2 and surrounds S1,
and F 2 ⊃ S1 and surrounds S2. If S1 and S2 simultaneously satisfy the conditions for
einselection, then HS1−F 1 >> HF 1 and HS2−F 2 >> HF 2. This requires that HS1−F 1 be
both much larger and much smaller than HS2−F 2, which is impossible. Non-overlapping
systems can, therefore, simultaneously satisfy the conditions for einselection only if they
are embedded in distinct environmental fragments. As einselection forces the state of the
fragment F i in which Si is embedded to be an eigenstate of HSi−F i, distinct fragments
F 1 and F 2 can only overlap if their states are simultaneous eigenstates of HS1−F 1 and
HS2−F 2. If this is the case, however, |S
1〉 or |S2〉 must also be simultaneous eigenstates of
both HS1−F 1 and HS2−F 2, in which case a measurement of either |S
1〉 or |S2〉 determines
the other without signalling. Such entanglement between |S1〉 or |S2〉 violates not only
classicality but the appearance of classicality; hence S1 and S2 can simultaneously emerge
into classicality by einselection only if their respective environmental fragments F 1 and F 2
are not only distinct but separable.
The preceding discussion has implicitly assumed that only a single observer extracts infor-
mation from the environment by passively interacting with F . If multiple observers simulta-
neously extract information, they must extract it from separable environmental fragments
in order to assure that their measurements do not interfere [9, 10]. Multiple observers that
share an objective “classical world” of multiple apparently-classical objects must, there-
fore, each have available a separable collection of mutually-separable environmental frag-
ments F i, one for each of the simultaneously-emergent objects. Such mutually-separable
environmental fragments are, however, themselves effectively classical objects: they have
boundaries that prevent mutual entanglement and are thus FAPP ontological. These ef-
fectively classical objects do not themselves “emerge”; their existence must be assumed
to explain the emergence of the simultaneously-einselected Si. Assuming the existence of
effectively classical objects to explain the emergence of other effectively classical objects by
einselection, however, accomplishes nothing, and without this assumption that the F i are
effectively classical, the explanation of emergence by einselection collapses.
Einselection cannot, therefore, be viewed as an observer-independent mechanism for the
emergence of classicality; doing so requires the assumption that the environment is effec-
tively classical and is therefore circular. This circularity cannot be rescued by a bootstrap
argument, since an effectively classical environmental fragment must be assumed for every
emerging object, and such an assumption must be made independently for every observer.
It also cannot be rescued by assuming a physical but observer-independent restriction on
the choice of systems to be einselected. Any such restriction - any specification of Zurek’s
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“axiom(o)” that “systems exist” [4] to an axiomatic assumption that only certain specified
systems exist - also introduces circularity, as it enforces classicality by violating the super-
position principle for states of U . If einselection is to be considered a physical mechanism
for the emergence of classicality, therefore, it can only be considered to be an observer-
dependent mechanism. The next section reformulates einselection as an observer-dependent
process in which superselection is implemented not by the system-environment Hamiltonian
but by an observer-deployed POVM.
4 Reformulating einselection using POVMs
Explicitly specifying a Hilbert space HS is not the only way to specify a quantum system;
one can also specify a system as whatever yields a particular set of values when acted upon
by a particular set of observables. For example, whatever has a mass of 0.511 MeV, an
electric charge of -1 and spin 1/2 is an electron. Observations can, in general, be represented
as sets {Ei} of positive semi-definite operators that sum to unity, i.e. as POVMs [16]. A
POVM is defined over a particular Hilbert space, and it is obviously circular to say that
a system S is whatever yields a particular set of values when acted upon by a POVM
{Ei} defined over HS . As emphasized by Zurek [3, 4], however, observers typically obtain
information about systems by acting on the environment. In what follows, therefore, all
POVMs are taken to be defined over HU , the Hilbert space of the universe as a whole. As
arbitrarily many components of a POVM can be normalized so as to yield arbitrarily small
measures, arbitrarily many of the degrees of freedom of U can be effectively insensitive to the
action of any given POVM. The degrees of freedom of U that are given significant measures
by a POVM {Ei} can be considered a “system” S
E recognized by {Ei}. Hence observers
can be regarded as querying the universe with a collection of POVMs, and identifying as
particular systems the collections of degrees of freedom recognized by those POVMs [23].
A von Neumann projective measurement [24] is a POVM {Πi} comprising an orthogonal set
of components Πi = |ei〉〈ei| where {|ei〉} is an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space over
which the measurement is defined. Any POVM can be represented as an appropriately re-
normalized subset of an “informationally complete” POVM that comprises a von Neumann
projective measurement together with a set of projections on mixtures of the von Neumann
basis vectors [27]. Hence any component Ei of a POVM {Ei} is a projection onto some
basis, even though the components do not, in general, all project onto the same basis.
Because the components of a POVM are in general not orthogonal, a measurement with
a POVM may result in non-negligible Born-rule probabilities 〈U |Ei|U〉 being associated
with projections onto distinct bases. Describing a system SE with a single basis during
any given time interval ∆t therefore requires that only a single component of the relevant
POVM {Ei} has a significant Born-rule probability during ∆t.
If within a time interval ∆t there is a single component Ek of a POVM {Ei} such that
〈U |Ek|U〉 >> 〈U |Ej |U〉 for any j 6= k, then the components of |U〉 for which {Ei} yields
non-negligible measures, i.e. the components of the recognized system SE, will be superse-
9
lected into the eigenstate |SEk 〉 of Ek. This superselection of |S
E
k 〉 by the action of {Ei} is
effectively einselection: it requires during the interval ∆t both that the physical interaction
between the observer and U that implements the action of {Ei} dominates the internal evo-
lution of SE , and that the evolution of the degrees of freedom outside SE have negligible
effect on |SEk 〉. If {Ei} is not a projective measurement, the superselected state |S
E
k 〉 is only
an approximate eigenstate, as is the case for einselected states if either HS or HF are non-
zero. Superselection by the action of a POVM can, therefore, be considered einselection by
an observer, as opposed to einselection by the environment.
From the perspective of an observer O deploying a POVM {Ei}, the requirement for eins-
election that a single component Ek exists such that 〈U |Ek|U〉 >> 〈U |Ej |U〉 for any j 6= k
can be re-expressed as the requirement that for all j 6= k, the value 〈U |Ej |U〉 ≤ ǫ, where
ǫ is O’s detection threshold for information transmitted from the environment. Physically,
this formulation of the condition for einselection says that, within the time interval ∆t, the
Born-rule probability 〈U |Ek|U〉 of observing |S
E
k 〉 is large while the Born-rule probabilities
〈U |Ej |U〉 for all j 6= k are neglibible. Under these conditions, O will either record “|S
E
k 〉” or
will record nothing. Hence from O’s perspective, the POVM component Ek can be consid-
ered to be a mapping from a physical quantum state |U〉 that is an approximate eigenstate
of Ek to an item of recordable classical information “|S
E
k 〉.” These items of information
must be encoded physically by O [28], but they are not themselves physical states of U :
the requirement that 〈U |Ej|U〉 ≤ ǫ for all j 6= k is non-linear and hence violates the super-
position principle. From the perspective of O, therefore, what is einselected by the action
of {Ei} is not a physical quantum state but an abstract, classical informational state.
Einselection by observers thus provides a mechanism for observer-dependent emergence in
the epistemic sense defined byWallace [17]. The only systems that an observer O can detect,
and hence the only systems that O can find “interesting” or theorize about, are the systems
recognized by the POVMs that O is capable of deploying. These POVMs constitute a priori
pragmatic information for O, as they are the tools - indeed, the only possible tools - that
O employs to obtain empirical information about the world. An observer equipped with
a POVM {Ei} may not know, prior to making observations with {Ei}, the current state
|SE〉 of SE, but such an observer knows what states of SE it is possible to observe, as these
are precisely the states projected by single, dominant components of {Ei}. The recordable
information |SEk 〉 that emerges from |U〉 when O deploys {Ei} is thus constrained by O’s
a priori pragmatic information, but only depends physically on the prior state of U ; hence
epistemic emergence driven by POVMs is both observer-dependent and fully deterministic.
5 Systems as virtual machines
The sense of emergence defined here is familiar from classical computer science. An observer
faced with a physical device D undergoing a sequence of state transitions can, given suitable
measurements, interpret the behavior of D as an execution trace of an algorithm A on some
specified input a. For example, an observer can interpret a sequence of head positions and
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writings or erasures of characters on the tape of a Turing machine as the execution of a
particular algorithm on a particular input. Such an interpretation is an abstract semantic
model of the behavior of D as a computation, i.e. it specifies a virtual machine realized by
the physical device D (e.g. [29]). Run in reverse, such interpretations specify the semantics
of machine-level programming languages. The semantics of quantum computing languages
[30, 31] have this form.
If observations are carried out with a POVM {Ei} under the conditions for einselection
described above, an observed sequence of state transitions has the form ...|Dj〉 at (ti), |Dk〉
at (ti+1), ..., where |Di〉 is the einselected information about D recorded when Ei is the
dominant component of {Ei} and ti is the time of the observation. As noted above, the
transitions between these states depend deterministically on the Hamiltonian HU and the
POVM {Ei}. However, they are not unitary; the unitary physical propagator e
−ıHU (t) is
defined over the physical states |U〉, not over the einselected informational states |D〉. The
transitions ...|Dj〉 at (ti), |Dk〉 at (ti+1), ... are, therefore, virtual transitions; as shown in
Fig. 1, they can be considered as state transitions within a classical finite state machine
(FSM) defined over the einselected |Di〉. As any observer deploying {Ei} to gain information
about D knows only the probabilities 〈U |Ei|U〉 a priori, the transitions between the |Di〉
are transitions in a stochastic finite state machine.
Virtual machine level:
Physical state level:
Virtual FSM
... ✲ |Dj〉 ✲ |Dk〉 ✲ ...
Ej
✻ ✻
Ek
e−ıHU (t)
... ✲ |U(ti)〉 ✲ |U(ti+1)〉 ✲ ...
Fig. 1: Semantic relationship between physical states of U and einselected virtual
states |Di〉 specifying a virtual machine implemented by a device D embedded in U .
Treating POVM components semantically as interpretation maps as shown in Fig. 1 re-
interprets “systems” across the board as virtual machines implemented by the elementary
entities whose states are recognized by an observer-deployable POVM. “Systems” are, there-
fore, purely informational entities that emerge in an observer-dependent, epistemic sense.
The ontological question of how systems are bounded within HU evaporates; systems do
not have even FAPP ontological boundaries. Zurek’s “axiom(o)” is no longer necessary;
only the elementary entities whose degrees of freedom compose HU need to be taken for
granted as existing things. All other systems exist only when someone looks, i.e. acts on
U with a POVM.
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6 Conclusion
Emergence in the observer-dependent, epistemic sense defined here is a bootstrap process:
from the assumption that observers can be characterized as deployers of POVMs that yield
classical information, the classical information that observers obtain as a result of deploying
these POVMs as information-gathering probes of the quantum world can be explained. The
explanation that is generated has, moreover, exactly the same form as is employed to explain
algorithm execution by physical devices: observable physical systems are virtual machines
in exactly the same sense that physically-implemented algorithms are virtual machines. The
idea that algorithm execution provides a general model for the emergent behavior of physical
systems was enunciated clearly by Turing [32], discussed broadly in connection with artificial
intelligence (e.g. [33, 34, 35]), and proposed as a general account of measurement [36, 37].
It has been overshadowed in the context of quantum theory by the goal of developing an
observer-independent account of the emergence of classicality. By showing that einselection
does not provide a mechanism for observer-independent emergence, the present paper opens
the way for further investigation of the conditions under which physical systems can be
described as implementations of particular algorithms.
From a more practical perspective, the interpretation of “systems” in purely informational
terms may contribute to resolving the problem of consistently describing the input and
output procedures for quantum computers. The requirement that inputs and outputs be
classically interpretable and hence measurable has led to input and output procedures
being treated as ad hoc encoding and decoding steps in describing the measurement-free
semantics of fully-unitary quantum computers (e.g. [38, 39, 16]). Treating classical inputs
and outputs as results of measurements carried out at the two endpoints of a fully-reversible
process may illuminate the somewhat problematic question of how quantum computation
is to be interpreted as algorithmic [40].
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